Last time, we talked about Procedural Due Process and one of its branches, Judicial Due Process. Today, let’s move on to Administrative Due Process.
To recap, Judicial Due Process has the following requisites:
- an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it
- jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
- an opportunity to be heard afforded to the defendant; and
- judgment rendered upon lawful hearing.
These should be followed by the judges in our courts and judicial tribunals. Otherwise, the proceedings will be null and void.
However, courts are not the only ones that can hand over judgment that can deprive someone of life, liberty, or property. We also have administrative bodies with quasi-judicial powers.
The best explanation I can find is:
“As a general rule, only courts of law have the authority to decide controversies that affect individual rights. One major exception to this general rule is the power of an ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY to make decisions concerning the rights of parties. An administrative agency is a body of government created by a legislature (or the Constitution in the case of Constitutional Commissions) and charged with supervision and regulation of a particular area of governmental concern. Part of the regulatory power given to an administrative agency is the power of adjudication. With the exception of rule-making, any decision by an agency that has a legal effect is a quasi-judicial action.”
–West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 2004
So in other words, there are other bodies or agencies that have been given powers similar to that of a judge. Thus they are called quasi-judicial because quasi means apparently, but not really. Examples are the NLRC which can decide labor cases and the Commission on Elections which can decide election cases.
Because they have powers similar to that of judges, these bodies can deprive life, liberty, or property (okay, maybe not life). Thus, their actions should follow procedural due process. But because these are not judges or courts, and the cases are not really cases, the due process that they follow is less strict than the due process judges have to observe.
So, let’s take a look at the less strict requisites of administrative due process:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision.
–Ang Tibay v. CIR, 1940
Funny how a less strict set of rules has to make us memorize more items. But jokes aside, the Ang Tibay case elucidates why these requisites are so many: because there are no rules in the first place. Thus, the SC laid down the cardinal primary rights which must be respected. The rules have to be exhaustive (but less strict) to prevent total disregard of due process. It’s safe to say that these are the MINIMUM requisites of procedural due process.
Let’s look at these requisites one by one.
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof
This is essentially the same with the opportunity to be heard requisite in judicial due process. The difference is that administrative due process does not require a trial-type hearing and is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
A great example is how labor cases are decided by the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC.
Due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would support their respective claims.
–Mariveles Shipyard v. Court of Appeals, 2003
Indeed, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are authorized to decide a case on the basis of position papers and documents submitted; the holding of an adversarial trial depends on the discretion of the Labor Arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.
–Fernandez v. NLRC, 1998
It also follows that cross-examination is not really indispensable, unlike in judicial process.
Remember this from the Judicial Due Process discussion?
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness against him is an indispensable part of due process.
–Ortigas v. Lufthansa, 1975
It’s met by this principle in Administrative Due Process:
But in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Since nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-examination, he cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place.
–Emin v. De Leon, 2002
Thus, it is enough that parties in an administrative proceedings are afforded the opportunity to be heard whether through position papers, oral arguments, or trial-type hearings, as long as they can present their case.
For the rest of the 7 requisites of administrative due process, the Ang Tibay case appropriately explains them:
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, . . ., “the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.”
(3) “While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.” This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be “substantial.” “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” . . . The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy….
(6) [The tribunal or officer], therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. . . .
(7) [The tribunal or officer] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
To set an example of non-observance of administrative due process, here is a summary of Zambales Chromite v. CA, 1979:
There was a decision by the Director of Mines which was appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. But, later on, the Director of Mines was promoted to Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Lo and behold, he reviewed HIS OWN DECISION and unsurprisingly affirmed it. The Supreme Court then annulled the proceedings, calling them “a mockery of administrative justice” lol.
I’m not sure which requisite this act specifically violates, but I’m guessing it falls under the 6th requisite: The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. After all, you can’t really act on your own independent consideration when you’re reviewing your own decision.
To recap, I think we really just have to memorize these 7 requisites of administrative due process, and we’re good to go. The way we reason to a situational problem will just come naturally.
Requisites of Administrative Due Process:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision.
EXTRA NOTES ON DUE PROCESS
Before we move on to the levels of scrutiny, here are some extra points on due process that will still be tackled later on in Civil Law (publication), Remedial Law (appeal), or the Political Law discussion on Rights of the Accused (preliminary investigation).
Publication is a part of due process.
Publication is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and is an indispensable part of due process.
–Tanada v. Tuvera, 1986
Right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Accordingly, the constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal, because the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one’s case.
–Alba v. Nitorreda, 1996
Just like the right to appeal, preliminary investigation is not a natural or constitutional right, but is merely conferred by statute.
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective. The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
–Budiongan v. De la Cruz, 2006
That’s it for due process, let’s move on to the levels of scrutiny in our next post.
The Bartender 
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