We’re down to our last post on the Bill of Rights! Yay.
Review proper is coming up and these posts will most likely not follow any specific order anymore. It’s nice that we’ll be done with the Bill of Rights before that.
Anyway, let’s get to it.
RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
This is a pretty straightforward right and its embedded in Sec. 18 together with the prohibition on detaining persons by reason of political beliefs:
Let’s first define involuntary servitude:
“Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, peonage, all denote ‘a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another.’ The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.”
–Rubi v. Provincial Board, 1919
In other words, involuntary servitude is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another no matter under what form such servitude may be disguised.
It’s good that there are no complications in this definition.
Let’s go straight to the exceptions of Sec. 18(2). One is already mentioned in the provision: “except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
Are there more? Yes, there are two more. One of them is in the Constitution, specifically Art. II, Sec. 4, allowing citizens to be compelled to render personal military or civil service:
The other one is a return-to-work order:
“It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker’s will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills. The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike.”
–Sarmiento v. Tuico, 1988
To recap, we have three exceptions to the right against involuntary servitude:
1. punishment for a crime
2. Art. II, Sec. 4 of the Constitution allowing to compel citizens to render military or civil service in the interest of national defense
3. A valid return-to-work order
Just in case, here are some other examples of circumstances that are not involuntary servitude along with reasons why.
1. Section 17. Pro Bono Services for Indigent Women. – Private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers including, but not limited to, gynecologists and obstetricians, are encouraged to provide at least forty-eight (48) hours annually of reproductive health services, ranging from providing information and education to rendering medical services, free of charge to indigent and low-income patients as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization, especially to pregnant adolescents. The forty-eight (48) hours annual pro bono services shall be included as a prerequisite in the accreditation under the PhilHealth.
This provision above in the RH Law is not involuntary servitude because (1) the practice of medicine is imbued with public interest, which allows for regulation by the State, (2) the provision only encourages, (3) the prerequisite for PhilHealth accreditation is not an unreasonable burden:
“It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.”
–Imbong v. Ochoa, 2014
2. A court stenographer that was fired was then compelled to transcribe his court stenographic notes under pain of contempt including incarceration. He was imprisoned at first for refusing but eventually did transcribe his notes. Is this a form of involuntary servitude? NO. Although the first paragraph here did not really explain why Sec. 18 was not violated, the second paragraph shows that a reason may be because of the inherent contempt power of the court necessary for the administration of service:
“Aclaracion’s contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not. That situation does not obtain in this case.
Also untenable is Aclaracion’s argument that the imprisonment of a stenographer who had defied the court’s resolution for the transcription of the notes constitutes illegal detention. The incarceration of the contemning stenographer is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a court order.”
–Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 1975
But what if he continues to refuse and it results in the prolonging of his imprisonment? We’re not really sure, but it can go either way as long a we provide sound reasoning:
“There may be cases, when an appellate court will be confronted with the obstinacy of a former stenographer holding fast to the conviction, even if not altogether justified, that he is the victim of an oppressive court order and that there is a disregard of his constitutional right not to be subjected to involuntary servitude. So it did happen in this case, marked by petitioner’s stubborn insistence of what he considered his sad and undeserved fate, one moreover, in his opinion, frowned upon by the Constitution. For a recognition that the exercise of the contempt power is warranted may still be attended with problems that defy easy and pat solutions. Its coercive aspect may be conceded, but given an individual like petitioner, not averse to suffering a species of martyrdom rather than give up a principle, and thus unable to yield obedience to an order requiring that he transcribe his notes, the detention consequent upon a contempt citation may be so prolonged that it assumes a punitive character. Then it appears to me the question is reached of whether there is involuntary servitude. From such a standpoint, I am not altogether persuaded that what is said in the opinion of the Court suffices for its disposition. There is, to my mind, a degree of complexity. For me, it should remain unresolved until the appropriate case comes. This is not it, as the petition has become moot and academic.”
-Justice Fernando Concurring Opinion, Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 1975
Let’s move on to the last section of the Bill of Rights.
Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
Questions are more likely to arise from the prohibition on ex post facto laws so let’s start with that.
EX POST FACTO LAWS
Let’s first define ex post facto laws.
“An ex post facto law has been defined as one —
(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely:
(e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or
(f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.”
-Salvador v. Mapa, 2007
There are a whopping 6 definitions of an ex post facto law. Should we memorize? Most likely.
From these definitions, we can derive that ex post facto laws are (1) retroactive, (2) prejudicial to the accused, and (3) penal in nature.
Penal laws are laws that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment:
“The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.”
-Salvador v. Mapa, 2007
However, a penal law is broad enough to cover burdens equivalent to a criminal penalty like disqualification from the practice of a profession or forfeiture of property as punishment for a wrongful act. This falls under letter (e) of the list above. An example is RA 1379:
“The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex post facto which inter alia ‘makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act,’ or, ‘assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful,’ it follows that that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.”
–Katigbak v Solicitor General, 1989
We’ll be good for the bar if we have the 6 definitions in mind, but let’s go a little deeper with some examples of ex post facto laws:
1. A law increasing the prescription period of a crime is an ex post facto law. This may fall under the letter (f) definition of ex post facto law because the accused was deprived the protection of prescription.
Reasoning:
“…would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.”
–People v. Sandiganbayan, 1992
The effect is that the new longer prescription period will not apply to offenses committed before the passing of the law.
Lol I think this is the only one involving an actual case aside from Katigbak which we cited earlier.
And here are some notable examples where there is no ex post facto law:
1. A judicial interpretation’s retroactive effect is not prohibited by Sec. 22 because no new law was created:
“Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to ‘an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed.’
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that law. Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application. But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.”
–Castro v. Deloria, 2009
2. A law which in effect limits a mode of appeal is not an ex post facto law because it is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Further, “the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory
in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided
for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.”:
“Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenor’s contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.”
–Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 1999
3. A penal law that is favorable to the accused may be given retroactive effect because it is not an ex post facto law if it does not prejudice the accused. For example, a law which merges two crimes, making one a mere aggravation of another, is favorable to the accused:
“In its Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of murder and illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. It stressed that R.A. 8294 cannot be given retroactive effect for it was enacted in 1997 while the crimes charged against the accused were committed in 1995. It held that to give R.A. 8294 retroactive effect would be prejudicial to the accused and violative of Art. III, Sec. 22 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that, ‘(n)o ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.’
We disagree. This Court has previously ruled that R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, and should thus be retroactively applied in the present case. It was thus error for the trial court to convict the accused of two separate offenses, i.e., Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions. The crime for which the accused may be charged is murder, aggravated by illegal possession of firearm.”
–People v. Casingal, 2000
4. Preventive suspension is not a penalty.
Thus, a law which requires that officials with pending cases be preventively suspended can be given retroactive effect:
“Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law.”
–Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 1984
And that’s enough of the examples. By now, I’m sure we get the feel of what are ex post facto laws or not.
Just one more note, judges cannot declare a law as ex post facto motu proprio:
“On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.”
–People v. Nitafan, 1999
Let’s go to bill of attainder.
BILL OF ATTAINDER
A bill of attainder is simply a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial.
SEGUE: Its prohibition belongs in Sec. 22 because it has the features of an ex post facto law:
“As Justice Frankfurter observed, ‘frequently a bill of attainder was * * * doubly objectionable because of its ex-post facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause — ‘No Bill of Attainder or ex-post facto law shall be passed.’ * * * Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex-post facto law. But if it is not an ex-post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder.'”
–People v. Ferrer, 1972
Let’s just have Justice Leonen discuss bills of attainder. He has a great lecture in Fuertes v. Senate (2020). In this case, the SC declared the Anti-Hazing Law as NOT a bill of attainder. I’ll just paste it here:
[Bills of attainder are prohibited under Article III, Section 22 of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
A bill of attainder is rooted in the historical practice of the English Parliament to declare certain persons—such as traitors—attainted, or stained, and that the corruption of their blood extended to their heirs, who would not be allowed to inherit from the “source” of the corruption. These attainted persons and their kin were usually so declared without the benefit of judicial process.
In modern times, a bill of attainder is generally understood as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. The earliest form of prohibition against the enactment of bills of attainder was introduced in the Malolos Constitution:
ARTICLE 14. No Filipino can be prosecuted or sentenced except by the judge or court that, by virtue of the laws previous to the crime, has been given jurisdiction, and in the mam1er that these laws prescribe.
A bill of attainder encroaches on the courts’ power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and to impose the corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
For a law to be considered a bill of attainder, it must be shown to contain all of the following: “a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.” The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the determination of guilt and imposable penalty.
In People v. Ferrer, this Court delved into the question of whether the Anti-Subversion Act, which declared illegal the Communist Party of the Philippines and any other organizations that constitute an “organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the Government under the control and domination of an alien power[,]” was a bill of attainder.
This Court found that the law was, in fact, not. It noted that the Anti Subversion Act would be a bill of attainder only if it had made it unnecessary for members of the Communist Party to have to be charged in court. Moreover, even if the Anti-Subversion Act specifically named the Communist Party, it would be insufficient to declare the law a bill of attainder:
Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan.
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers “to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method,” was upheld by this Court.
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder . It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, or from exercising their profession, or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engaged in subversive activities, or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be “judicially noticeable,” the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Company, Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government, were also found not to be bills of attainder. This Court declared that the finding of guilt must still be made by a court, namely, the Sandiganbayan:
In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably construed as a determination or declaration of guilt. On the contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 14, make it perfectly clear that any judgment of guilt in the amassing or acquisition of “ill-gotten wealth” is to be handed down by a judicial tribunal, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed and prosecuted by the PCGG. In the second place, no punishment is inflicted by the executive orders, as the merest glance at their provisions will immediately make apparent. In no sense, therefore, may the executive orders be regarded as a bill of attainder.
Here, the mere filing of an Information against petitioner and her fellow sorority members is not a finding of their guilt of the crime charged. Contrary to her claim, petitioner is not being charged merely because she is a member of the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, but because she is allegedly a principal by direct participation in the hazing that led to Abracia’s death. As stated, these are matters for the trial court to decide. The prosecution must still prove these offense, and the accused’s participation in it, beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, in turn, may present her defenses to the allegations.
Parenthetically, the amendments in Republic Act No. 11053 may be applied retroactively in cases like petitioner’s where the hazing resulted in death, contrary to the position taken by public respondents. Previously, should an accused fail to overturn the prima facie presumption, they would be charged as principals, with a corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua when the hazing resulted in death. Now, Section 14(c) imposes the lower penalty for one’s presence during the hazing-reclusion temporal in its maximum period with a P1-million fine. As the penalty is not reclusion perpetua, the accused may also benefit from the application of Republic Act No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Legislative acts are presumed constitutional. To be declared unconstitutional, a statute or any of its provisions must be shown to have clearly and unmistakably breached the Constitution. Petitioner has failed to discharge her burden of overcoming the presumption of the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Those who object to, intervene against, or attempt to stop the despicable or inhumane traditions or rituals of an organization or institution may be branded as duwag, nakakahiya, walang pakisama, traydor. Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law turns cowardice into virtue, shame into strength, and disobedience into heroism. More than that, this serves as a grave warning that failing to act—knowing fully well that others are being traumatized, injured, maimed, or killed—does not make a person only an observer or witness. It makes them a perpetrator.]
–Fuertes v. Senate, 2020, penned by Justice Leonen
Thus, the elements of a bill of attainder are:
1. a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals
2. the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise
3. and the lack of judicial trial.
The most essential of these elements is #3, the complete exclusion of the courts from the determination of guilt and imposable penalty.
Thus, the Anti-Subversion Act and the Anti-Hazing Law were/are not ex post facto laws because even if a person is a member of the Communist Party or a member of a fraternity/sorority present during an initiation (element #1 and perhaps element #2 are present), he/she must still need to undergo a judicial process and be tried in court for his/her guilt to be determined and for punishment to be meted (element #3 is not present).
And that’s it! We’re done with the Bill of Rights! I’m sorry I can’t exhaust all the syllabus topics because there won’t be enough time. I’ll finish this passion project right after the bar. But for now, I’ll still write blog posts, just not following the sequence of the syllabus.
Next up, evidence!
The Bartender 