We’re nearing the end of the Bill of Rights (Article III), the article with the most questions in the Political Law Bar Exams. Yay.
Double Jeopardy will also be the last “mind-numbing” topic, so let’s get this done.
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBTS
The prohibition on imprisonment for debts is embedded in Sec. 20:
It’s pretty straightforward and easy to digest. Nevertheless let’s look at its history and later on, some potential questions:
“First of all, it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the people’s revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union.
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of the century and embodied in our organic laws. Later, our fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax.”
–Lozano v. Martinez, 1986
From the above we can see that the purpose of the provision is to prevent a barbaric practice. We can also see that a poll tax just means a cedula.
What does “debt” mean in Sec. 20? It refers to civil debt (ex contractu) and not one arising from a criminal offense (ex delicto):
“In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense.”
–In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, 2003
“The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime.”
–Lozano v. Martinez, 1986
This means that a simple debt cannot be a reason for someone to be imprisoned. BUT, if the debt is out of fraud, like estafa, then the person can be imprisoned but not because of the debt but because of the fraud (criminal offense).
So is the penalty of imprisonment valid in B.P. 22? Yes. Because it does not punish the non-payment of the obligation. Instead, it punishes the act of issuing worthless checks:
“The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.”
–Lozano v. Martinez, 1986
So what about subsidiary penalties? Aren’t they supposed to violate Sec. 20 because in effect, the people who cannot pay their fines or monetary indemnity will be imprisoned? No. Because, for the same reason as above, fines and indemnities arise out of the criminal act (ex delicto) and are not a contractual obligations (ex conctractu):
[“The authorities almost unanimously hold that the debt intended to be covered by the constitutional provisions must be a debt arising exclusively from actions ex contractu, and was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, or fines, penalties, and other impositions imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crimes committed against the common or statute law.” (Ruling Case Law, Vol. X, p. 1384, par. 175.)
“Notwithstanding the prohibitions against imprisonment for debt, where a person incurs civil liability by a wrongful act such prohibitions generally have no application and he may be imprisoned because of such act. Thus, it is held that an arrest may be authorized in an action for libel, or in an action of trover for conversion. So also it is held not a violation of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt to authorize the arrest of a defendant in an action for seduction, trespass, or assault and battery, etc.” (Ruling Case Law, supra, par. 176 and decisions therein cited.)
“The constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt, applies to actions on contracts, express or implied. As to the debts thereby intended, there must be the relation of debtor and creditor. The prohibition does not extend to actions for torts, nor to fines or penalties arising from a violation of the penal laws of the State.”]
–People v. Cara, 1917
Now let’s get to double jeopardy.
RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
This is a mathematical provision and a Bar favorite so let’s get excited (?)
REQUISITES; SCOPE
Let’s start with the first and more important sentence of Sec. 21.
Double jeopardy is a defense where the accused has to prove the existence of three requisites:
“To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.”
–Canceran v. People, 2015
We’ll have to discuss these three requisites one by one.
Wait, actually we’ll have to discuss the first two requisites together as jurisprudence now does that by enumerating the requisites for the attachment of the RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY and NOT JUST THE FIRST JEOPARDY.
There are five requisites to the attachment of the right against double jeopardy:
“Jurisprudence has provided that for the said right to attach, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a valid indictment,
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction,
(3) the arraignment of the accused,
(4) a valid plea entered by him, and
(5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.”
–Justice Caguioa Concurring Opinion, Yokohama v. Reyes, 2020
So what do we mean by valid indictment?
It basically means a valid information or complaint, or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. This is reflected in the underlined sentence below in Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the provision on double jeopardy:
“Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.“
–Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court
This means that a defective Information or complaint will not place the accused in jeopardy.
This also means that jeopardy does not attach in a preliminary investigation that happens before the filing of a valid information or complaint.
To be sufficient in form, it has to abide by the proper procedure. For example, Complaints or Informations must abide by Rule 110. Thus, if the crime of adultery or concubinage is not initiated by the offended spouse, jeopardy will not attach because there is no valid indictment for Under Rule 110, Sec. 5, “the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.”:
To be sufficient in substance, we should just remember the discussion on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. For example, if the ultimate facts alleged do not constitute the elements of an offense, jeopardy does not attach.
Now, what do we mean by a court of competent jurisdiction?
It’s pretty self-explanatory because all proceedings in a court with no jurisdiction are null and void:
“When the court that takes cognizance of the case is without jurisdiction, either because the crime charged is outside the ambit of the court’s powers or because the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, all proceedings in such court are void and the accused cannot be convicted.”
-Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the R.P. A Commentary, 2009, p. 593
Thus, if a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, then another case can still be filed because the first jeopardy has not attached:
“The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present its own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the information, there is no second jeopardy to speak of.”
–People v. Puno, 1992
“In cases of lack of authority or jurisdiction on the part of the judge, the proceedings taken by him are null and the trial of the accused under said circumstances has not placed him in danger of conviction because there has been no really valid trial.”
–People v. Bautista, 1939
The phrase “has not placed him in danger of conviction” is a favorite by the court and we should use it to justify whether there is double jeopardy or not. After all, the word “jeopardy” means danger of loss, harm, or failure.
Jurisdictions of the different courts can be found in B.P. 129. Thus, if the crime of murder is filed in the MTC, the MTC has no jurisdiction and jeopardy can never attach. And if the murder took place in Iloilo City but the Information was filed in the RTC of Quezon City, the latter court also has no jurisdiction because in criminal cases, venue is an essential part of jurisdiction.
What about ARRAIGNMENT? Well we already know what that is and it’s closely connected to the fourth requisite which is a VALID PLEA.
The requisites of arraignment and plea were first introduced in Ylagan v. People (1933). It is now well-settled that arraignment and plea constitute the final steps in the commencement of jeopardy. Before this, the view was that there is no jeopardy until a witness has been called:
“It is true that in United States vs. Ballentine, this court has held that there is no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has actually been commenced by the calling of a witness; but we are now convinced that such a view should be abandoned. There is no provision or principle of law requiring such a condition for the existence of legal jeopardy. All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial ‘in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined.’ Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and stand trial.”
–Ylagan v. People, 1933
In one case involving the Military Commission, the accused filed a written manifestation that he pleads not guilty. However, at the time, the Military Commission was not in session. This is not a valid plead, thus, jeopardy will not attach:
“Under the facts appearing of record the petitioner cannot claim double jeopardy. There was no valid plea to the original information. The petitioner could not have entered a valid plea of not guilty by simply filing a written manifestation and plea when the respondent Military Commission was not in session. Hence the case alleged in the original information cannot be deemed to have been terminated after the petitioner had entered a plea.”
–Jimenez v. Military Commission, 1981
There is also a peculiar situation where the accused first pleads guilty and then later on presents evidence that amounts to self-defense. If the Court acquits him, can he then be prosecuted for the same offense? The answer is weirdly yes for the simple technicality that he withdrew his original plea of guilty when he presented evidence amounting to self-defense:
“It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, People v. Quimsing). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore – as the court a quo recognized in its decision – had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him.”
–People v. Balisacan, 1966
And for the last requisite for the right against jeopardy to attach, there must be an acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the case against him was dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
This last requisite is important because there have been many instances where two Informations were filed against the accused for the same offense. This is of course kind of wrong, but it should not be a basis to sort of let the accused “off the hook” by attaching a first jeopardy to one of the Informations:
“It is well-settled that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his express consent. It is the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or termination of the case that bars further prosecution of the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”
–Tangan v. People, 1987
Acquittal and conviction are pretty easy concepts, but there’s just a minor issue that can be used as a question, the finality of acquittal doctrine.
There are three purpose why the doctrine exists:
“The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.”
–People v. CA, 2007
It states that judgments of acquittal are FINAL EVEN IF ERRONEOUS. However, the exception to this doctrine is that the acquittal is not a bar to double jeopardy if the prosecution was denied due process:
“The finality-of-acquittal doctrine, of course, is not without exception. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine does not apply when the prosecution — the sovereign people, as represented by the State — was denied a fair opportunity to be heard. Simply put, the doctrine does not apply when the prosecution was denied its day in court — or simply, denied due process. As the Court explained in the case of People v. Hernando:
Notwithstanding, the error committed can no longer be rectified under the cardinal rule on double jeopardy. The judgment of acquittal in favor of an accused necessarily ends the case in which he is prosecuted and the same cannot be appealed nor reopened because of the doctrine that nobody may be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Respondents have been formally acquitted by respondent Court, albeit erroneously. That judgment of acquittal is a final verdict. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit. The proceedings in the Court below were not an absolute nullity as to render the judgment of acquittal null and void. The prosecution was not without the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of Leonico Talingdan, the witness on new trial. It cannot be justifiably claimed, therefore, that the prosecution was deprived of its day in Court and denied due process of law, which would have rendered the judgment of acquittal a nullity and beyond the pale of a claim of double jeopardy. What was committed by respondent Judge was a reversible error but which did not render the proceedings an absolute nullity.“
–Justice Caguioa Concurring Opinion, Yokohama v. Reyes, 2020, citing People v Hernando, 1981
A famous example when the acquittal was declared a nullity was in the case against Ninoy Aquino’s killers wherein it was found that the Judge had meetings along with the prosecution in the Malacanang. This showed his partiality:
“Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence.
x x x x
In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the “treacherous and vicious assassination” and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.”
–Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 1986
Now what do we mean by “the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent”?
It means that the dismissal is neither of the following:
(1) the accused was the one who initiated the motion to dismiss or motion to quash the information and the dismissal is without prejudice or
(2) the prosecution initiated the motion to provisionally (temporarily) dismiss the case with the express consent of the accused.
BUT TAKE NOTE. There are two exceptions to the “dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.” Even if the accused consented to the dismissal, double jeopardy may still attach if:
1. there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him
2. the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated:
“As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.”
–Saldariega v. Panganiban, 2015
And this applies even if the dismissal was erroneous:
“But the defense of double jeopardy will be available to the accused where the dismissal of the prosecution against him, even with his express consent, was based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution or denial of his right to a speedy trial, because these dismissals are considered in the nature of an acquittal. As such, they cannot be appealed by the prosecution and will bar another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense; and this is true even if the dismissal be erroneous.”
-Justice Isagani Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007, p. 365
The first exception presupposes that the accused moved to dismiss AFTER the prosecution has presented its evidence because how can there be an insufficiency of evidence when the prosecution has yet to present the evidence. The nuances of this rule can be better understood by studying the rules on “demurrer to evidence” in remedial law.
Regarding the second exception, it’s important to remember that a dismissal of a case based on the violation of an accused right to speedy trial is equivalent to an acquittal:
“The remedy an accused has for violation of his right to speedy trial is dismissal of the case and, if he is under detention, release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is therefore a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”
-Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the R.P. A Commentary, 2009, p. 529
Thus, in one very peculiar case that also appeared in the 2000 bar, the judge dismissed a case for failure to prosecute BUT since the right to speedy trial was not invoked by the accused, the SC ruled that jeopardy did not attach:
“It is true that in an, unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.”
–People v. Tampal, 1995
So does that mean all forms of dismissal can’t be appealed? NO:
“As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case, by the proper court, after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information, shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense, in the former complaint or information. However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if:
(1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and
(2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and
(3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”
–People v Desalisa, 1966
We already know the reason for first and second requisites enumerated above. What we should note here is the 3rd requisite which states that appeals should only involve purely legal questions. ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT THESE ARE REQUISITES SO ALL THREE SHOULD BE PRESENT.
Now that we’re done with the first two requisites, let’s go to the third requisite for the defense of double jeopardy: the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
What do we mean by “the same offense“?
Perhaps this provision in the Rules of Court will make it clearer:
The highlighted portion is also known as the improved version of the SAME EVIDENCE TEST:
“In order to determine whether the two charges are identical, one test used is what is sometimes referred to as ‘the same evidence test’: whether the evidence needed in the one case will support a conviction in the other. Commentators note that this test was found to be correct only in a general sense and, hence, the Rules of Court have spelled it out more in detail in Section 7 of Rule 117.”
-Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the R.P. A Commentary, 2009, p. 607
Thus, the term “same offense” includes:
1. the exact offense charged in the first case
2. An attempt or frustration of the offense charged in the first case
3. any offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the first case
3. any offense necessarily included in the offense charged in the first case
We’re already familiar with the first two above. The last three are also known as “identical offenses.”
To determine the last two enumerations of the “same offense” or to know whether a crime is necessarily included in another, we have Rule 120, Sec. 5:
“Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.”
–Rule 120, Rules of Court
SEGUE: This provision is familiar because it was used in the VARIANCE DOCTRINE in our discussion here. But unlike the variance doctrine where the accused can only be convicted of the offense necessarily included in another or THE LESSER OFFENSE, in the right against double jeopardy, the accused cannot be prosecuted by either the LESSER or GREATER OFFENSE if the jeopardy for one of them already attached. Wow that’s a mouthful. In other words, the variance doctrine caters to the lesser offense, while the same evidence test DOES NOT. It protects the accused whether the first jeopardy against him is from a lesser or a greater offense.
It would probably be best to provide examples:
1. Acts of Lasciviousness under RA 7610 is necessarily included in Rape by Sexual Assault (Most common)
2. Possession of Illegal Drugs is necessarily included in the Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution, Transport of Illegal Drugs under R.A. 9165. The same with the Selling of Illegal Drugs
3. Qualified Theft necessarily included in Estafa 1(b)
4. Rape by Sexual Assault IS NOT necessarily included in Rape through Sexual Intercourse
5. Illegal Recruitment IS NOT necessarily included in Estafa and vice versa
6. Violation of B.P. 22 IS NOT necessarily included in Estafa and vice versa
In reasoning why one offense is not necessarily included in the other, we simply cite Sec. 5 of Rule 120 and say that their essential elements are different.
LIMITATIONS
BUT WAIT, of course the same evidence test has exceptions that can also be found in Rule 117, Sec. 7:
[However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.]
The first exception is probably the most famous and is known as the DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT or DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING FACTS.
This can be explained by an old case:
“Stating it in another form, the rule is that ‘where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense’ (15 Am. Jur. 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.”
–Melo v. People, 1950
In other words, one cannot be in jeopardy for an offense which has not yet existed at the time of the filing of the information. This is the reckoning point. Because if the offense existed prior and during the filing of the information, the accused can never be convicted of the graver offense because that would be in violation of his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.
A perfect example would be if the accused was convicted of serious physical injuries, but after conviction, the victim died as a result of the very same injuries for which the accused was convicted, double jeopardy cannot be raised as a defense because of Rule 117 Sec. 7(a). For the provision to apply, the graver or greater offense which supervened must have arisen out of the same act or omission constituting the former offense charged.
Rule 117 Sec. (b) and (c) are already pretty self-explanatory so we don’t need to discuss them.
Oh and I guess we already discussed a type of limitation above. Let me just paste it here:
BUT TAKE NOTE. There are two exceptions to the “dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.” Even if the accused consented to the dismissal, double jeopardy may still attach if:
1. there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him
2. the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated:
“As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.”
–Saldariega v. Panganiban, 2015
There is also another limitation: verbal dismissals are not a valid basis for the termination of the first jeopardy:
“Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches.
The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is now showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.”
–Abay v. Garcia, 1988
This principle can be useful when a witness is late and the judge verbally dismisses a case for violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial, but then the witness later on appears. In such a case where the dismissal was not yet reduced in writing and signed by him, he can set the verbal dismissal aside and continue the trial.
Oh and another limitation that we already discussed above is the exception to the FINALITY OF ACQUITTAL DOCTRINE which is simply when the prosecution is denied due process or is not given its day in court. I won’t bother to paste the full discussion here. We can just scroll up.
And the last one which we also discussed above, appeals to dismissals are not covered by the right against double jeopardy if:
“However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if:
(1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and
(2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and
(3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”
–People v Desalisa, 1966
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT
The second sentence of Sec. 21 does not mean that no one can be prosecuted twice for the same act because that would be absurd. For example, a person can be convicted of both B.P. 22 and estafa.
“While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of informations does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.”
–Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 1990
The second sentence of Sec. 21 means that if an act is punishable by BOTH a national and an ordinance, the termination of the first case filed shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same act. And it does not matter if the offenses are the same or not. What matters is if they are based on the same act or set of acts:
“The first sentence of Article IV (22) (Now Art. III (21)) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) (Now Art. III (21)) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero.”
–People v. Relova, 1987
“Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.”
–People v. Relova, 1987
For example:
1. Ordinance-carrying of deadly weapons, National law- Section 26 of Act No. 1780 for having carried in his possession a deadly weapon
2. Ordinance against installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid, National law- Theft, Article 308
3. Ordinance punishing reckless driving, National Law-Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries
I guess that’s it. Only the right against involuntary servitude, ex post facto laws, and bills of attainder are left and we’re done with the Bill of Rights!
Here’s a mind map for Double Jeopardy. Just download and zoom in to make the words clearer:
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Preview:
The Bartender 