We’ve recently covered Rights of Persons Under Custodial Investigation. Those rights are available to persons that have been singled out as suspects. Now, let’s go in deeper with the rights of persons already charged with a crime (but some rights here apply even before they are charged).
It’s sad that rights of the accused are not placed in order in the Bill of Rights vis-a-vis the syllabus, but we’ll have to make do.
Let’s start with Criminal due process under Sec. 14(1).
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
FUN FACT:
According Fr. Bernas, Sec. 14(1)’s purpose is more symbolic than substantive because due process in criminal proceedings is still a requisite by virtue of the Due Process Clause under Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights:
“It was pointed out that the subject was already adequately covered by Section 1. The retention of the provision, however, was preferred for reasons extraneous to the substance of the provision. Commissioner Bernas noted: ‘I do not think it is timely to delete this now because we have just experienced a period when there was very little respect for due process in criminal proceedings. For us now to delete this might give the message to the people that we are reducing their rights.'”
-Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the R.P. A Commentary, 2009, p. 497
Because we already tackled Due Process before, let’s look at it’s two aspects, substantive and procedural:
“What is substantive due process?”
Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law or government action that interferes with the rights of a person to life, liberty, or property. It serves as a restriction on the government’s law- and rule-making powers.
“What is procedural due process?”
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. It serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of government.
It should be noted that Criminal Due Process refers to the procedural due process in criminal proceedings:
“For clarity, the criminal due process clause of the Bill of Rights refers to procedural due process. It simply requires that the procedure established by law or the rules be followed.”
-Justice Jardeleza Dissenting Opinion, De Lima v. Guerrero, 2017
(The fact that this came from a dissenting opinion doesn’t matter. It’s just a basic intro and is not the dissenting principle in the opinion)
And it just assumes that substantive due process is satisfied (the penal law is valid):
“…the criminal due process clause of the Bill of Rights presupposes that the penal law being applied satisfies the substantive requirements of due process.”
-Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the R.P. A Commentary, 2009, p. 498
Enough of the intro, let’s get to the point.
The requisites of Criminal Due Process have been enumerated as early as 1910 during the period of American Rule:
“This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.”
–Ong Chang Wing v. U.S., 1910
Thus, the requisites of criminal due process are:
1. The accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction
2. The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law
3. The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard
4. The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law
This enumeration does not really need case examples as there are no complications on this as far as I know. But, it’s still important to memorize this as it may be useful as a “bar bullet” because it’s broad enough to encompass all the other Constitutional rights of the accused like the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial, etc. So, if we discuss all the related cases that involves criminal due process, we’ll probably end up discussing all of the rights of the accused.
Thus, criminal due process can be used either as a supplement or as a last resort in answering questions related to the Constitutional rights of the accused.
Alright, let’s go to the right to Bail.
BAIL
This topic often appears in bar exams, so we’ll probably have to go a little deeper in our discussions.
Let’s turn to Justice Leonen to explain the right to bail:
“Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:
‘The right to bail emanates from the [accused’s constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.’“
–People v. Escobar, 2017, penned by Justice Leonen
We can also turn to Rule 114 for a definition of bail and the forms of bail
“Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.”
–Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court
I like Justice Leonen’s more specific definition of bail because it includes:
1. the release is temporary
2. not available to a person whose guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt (this presupposes final conviction with no possibility of appeal anymore because bail can still be filed on appeal/after conviction in a trial court)
But, Sec. 1, Rule 114 also includes:
(1) who furnishes the bail
1. the person applying for bail, or
2. the bondsman)
(2) the purpose of bail which is to guarantee the person’s appearance as required under certain conditions,
(3) the forms of bail
1. corporate surety
2. property bond
3. cash deposit
4. recognizance
The right to bail is embedded in Sec. 13:
We can divide the contents of this provision:
1. General Rule:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient securities before conviction or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law
2. Exception:
Except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong
3. Non-impairment of the right to bail even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
4. Prohibition on excessive bail
Memorize the contents of this provision by heart.
Bail as a Matter of Right v. Bail as a Matter of Judicial Discretion
The first sentence of Sec. 13 means that bail may be a matter of right (General Rule above) or a matter of judicial discretion (Exception above):
“Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment—’regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution’—and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.”
–People v. Escobar, 2017, penned by Justice Leonen
The question of whether the bail is a matter of right or discretion is often asked in the bar as it can look simple but be complicated at the same time.
These are the important provisions in the Rules of Court (Sec. 4, 5, 7):
“Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the state of the criminal prosecution.“
–Sec. 4 and 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court
Let’s try to build a diagram for these provisions, taking into account both Sec. 13 of the Constitution and Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
A clearer version can be found here. Just zoom in.
Here’s a simple (kind of) explanation of the diagram:
“All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.”
–Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015
Examples:
1. Prior to conviction, a person accused of homicide shall be granted bail as a matter of right because homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. But, if he is convicted, bail becomes a matter of discretion because reclusion temporal is a punishment that lasts for more than 6 years.
2. Prior to conviction, if a person is accused of parricide or murder, bail is a matter of discretion depending on whether the evidence of guilt is strong because these crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua. But, after conviction, provided they are convicted of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, the person should be denied bail, or if he already is enjoying bail, the bail should be cancelled.
3. Rebellion is punishable by reclusion temporal. So it is obviously bailable. I thought rebellion was also punishable by reclusion perpetua before, so be vigilant if this comes up.
In one case, after a person was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the judge increased the bail. He was wrong because the proper action would be to cancel the bail:
“The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the respondent Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and possessed sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong.12 Thus, as the accused in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did.“
–Dipatuan v. Mangotara, 2010
So let’s look into some potential complications:
1. What if there is a mitigating circumstance which lowers the penalty to one degree?
General Rule:
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT MATTER. There would be a need for a complete trial in that case because evidence has to be presented to prove the mitigating circumstances:
“When the Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers to a finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial.”
–Bravo v. Borja, 1985
To support this general rule: The presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is not considered by the Constitution because of the phrase “charged with offenses punishable by.” It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility that a mitigating circumstance will be appreciated in favor of the accused.
Exception:
There may be circumstances that can be considered without the need of a trial (either ADMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION (They did not object) or is subject to JUDICIAL NOTICE):
“There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.”
–Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015, referring to Bravo v. Borja, 1985
The key here is:
(1) if the prosecution admits to it, or
(2) if the Court takes judicial notice of it.
Example:
In this case, the accused was a minor. His minority was considered to reduce his penalty of death by one degree because the Prosecution did not object to his minority in the bail hearing. (ADMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION)
“Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it follows that, if convicted, he would be given “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law,” which effectively rules out the death penalty.
x x x x
It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.”
–Bravo v. Borja, 1985
The last sentence above is important. Bail becomes a matter of right.
BUT, in theory, this would not apply if the crime is a special law which imposes LIFE IMPRISONMENT instead of RECLUSION PERPETUA where mitigating circumstances apply.
That’s why the UP Law Center came up with these answers:
BUT, TAKE NOTE! In drug cases, the principle of Bravo v. Borja (1985) can still apply because R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act) states that if the offender is a minor, the imposable penalty is NOT life imprisonment but reclusion perpetua:
“SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. — Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.”
–Sec. 98, R.A. 9165, 2001
On to the next problem.
2. What if the person seeking bail is charged with an imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua but is also justifying a grant for bail because his continued incarceration is injurious to his health or endangers his life?
Then that person will be allowed bail because he is Enrile. Jk.
DISCLAIMER: This is not discussed in Riano’s 2019 Book on Criminal Procedure even if it repeatedly cites Enrile v. Sandiganbayan. There also seems to be no clear consensus on its application and there also seems to be some procedural confusion as to how it was voted upon. So, it may not appear in the Bar. Who knows.
I’ll just highlight this following section for caution.
In Enrile’s case, he was charged with plunder, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. His failing health was the reason for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds.
“Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.”
–Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015
The keywords here are that it should be clearly shown TO BE INJURIOUS TO HIS HEALTH OR TO ENDANGER HIS LIFE.
NOTE: It is NOT a mitigating circumstance that reduced Enrile’s penalty in case of conviction. He was granted bail because of SPECIAL, HUMANITARIAN, and COMPELLING circumstances.
The excerpt above is quite difficult to digest especially the REGARDLESS OF THE CRIME CHARGED and INDEPENDENTLY OF THE MERITS OF THE CHARGE. It seems to throw the whole Constitution and Rules of Procedure out the window. That’s probably why Riano did not even aknowledge the case’s ruling even if it repeatedly cites some portions of the case. Nevertheless, if the facts in the bar question are eerily similar to Enrile’s case, let’s use the excerpt above as reasoning.
BUT THEN, this Enrile ruling was tested in 2020 in IN THE MATTER OF THE URGENT PETITION FOR THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS IN THE MIDST OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC when multiple prisoners prayed for the SC to exercise “equity jurisdiction” and grant them “temporary liberty on humanitarian grounds.” The SC did not grant their prayer, but merely treated them as APPLICATIONS FOR BAIL/RECOGNIZANCE and referred them to their respective trial courts for proper hearing. For each prisoner, there could be a grant of bail if “continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his/her health or to endanger his/her life” because that is the justification for Enrile’s grant of bail:
“In this case, petitioners have been charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. As such, they are not entitled to bail as a matter of right. Consequently, there is a need to conduct summary hearings for the purpose of weighing the strength of the prosecution’s evidence as to petitioners’ guilt. This process entails a reception and an evaluation of evidence which the trial courts are competent to handle. The foregoing holds true with respect to the motions for other confinement arrangements which also necessitate reception and evaluation of evidence by a trial court. Hence, being a court of last resort, this Court ingeminates and reminds the Bench and the Bar that it is not the proper avenue or forum to ventilate factual questions especially if they are presented for adjudication on the first instance.“
–In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020
It’s funny because the main decision did not tackle the important issues and did not discuss the Enrile ruling. They left the important discussions up to the separate opinions WHICH DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER(!!!) so we still don’t have a conclusive idea as to the Enrile ruling’s application to future cases.
ANYWAY…
I think there’s a good chance this question comes up. Just like in the case, we should rule that:
(1) The Supreme Court should treat the petitions as applications for bail or recognizance because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
(2) A bail hearing is mandatory. Bail cannot be granted absence of a hearing for bail.
Okay. I guess that’s it for Bail as a Matter of Right v. Discretionary
Let’s move on to the importance of a hearing.
Mandatory Hearing
The question now is, how do we know if evidence of guilt is strong? Who decides? Well, the prosecution has to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong:
“Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.”
–Sec. 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court
The hearing referred to above is MANDATORY:
“…as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, ‘such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.’ It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.”
–Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015
Such hearing should be conducted even if the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the person’s guilt is strong:
“It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges.
Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
“1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.”
–Cortes v. Judge Catral, 1997
Thus, in both bail as a matter of right or matter of discretion, what is mandatory is a NOTICE of hearing. But in bail as a matter of discretion, the CONDUCT of the hearing is what is mandatory.
But according to Justice Leonen, the bail hearing is MANDATORY BOTH for bail as a matter of right and discretion.
The purpose of the mandatory hearing in the right to bail is to determine the amount of bail:
“The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.”
–Justice Leonen Dissenting Opinion, Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015
Who is correct? Not sure, but it’s not that important.
Alright, that’s it for hearings.
The next question to have in mind is if bail is defined as the security given for the temporary release of a person who is “arrested and detained” or “in custody of the law,” does that mean a person not in custody can’t post bail?
Bail Requirement: Applicant Must be in Custody
The answer to the question above is YES!
We might think that the Miriam Santiago case is an exception, but we’ll get to that just a little bit later.
Okay. So first, to clarify, a free man is not entitled to bail. The person applying for bail must be “in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty”:
“Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is ‘the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him [or her] or a bondsman, to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified.’ Based on this definition, the accused must be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty to be able to post bail.”
–Tejano v. Marigomen, 2017
There are many versions of the excerpt above in other cases, but they basically mean the same:
“Admittedly, bail is unavailing with respect to an accused who has not voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet to be placed under legal custody. Hence, an application for admission to bail of a person against whom a criminal action has been filed, but who is still at large is premature.”
–Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr., 1995
Custody over the person can be acquired by either
1. arrest
2. voluntary surrender:
“As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a case, ‘it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.'”
–Paderanga v. CA, 1995
The reason for the requirement of custody is to deter persons from letting others post bail for them so that the courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over them (because one of the means for the court to acquire jurisdiction over a person is through voluntary appearance):
“The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.”
–Miranda v. Tuliao, 2006
Thus, if such practice of posting bail through another person be allowed, and if the bail was eventually denied, the accused can then just escape without the court ever acquiring jurisdiction over him.
So what happened in Miriam’s case?
- April 1991, Miriam was in a major car crash that may or may not be an assassination attempt
- May 1991. a case of graft and corruption was filed against her
- She file an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond,” citing her confinement and inability to personally appear before the court. She also sought “that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,” and categorically prayed “that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted” and that by said motion “she be considered as having placed herself under the custody” of said court.
- The court then authorized the post of a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court.
So does this mean that there was an exception created? NO.
The SC in that decision emphasized that the rule is the person should first be under custody before bail can be granted. To further explain the Miriam case, here’s the explanation from a subsequent similar case:
“In said case, the petitioner, who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an ‘Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond.’ Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave ‘that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings.’ On the basis of said ex parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.”
–Paderanga v. CA, 1995
Thus, in Miriam’s case, there really was no exception created. It’s just that because of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration, the court allowed her to post bail. Besides, in the motion, she also sought to be placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the court.
Bottom line is, let’s not use Miriam’s case as an “exception.” Because first, the issue in that case is centered on the jurisdiction of the court over her and not really about bail. Second, there is another case that’s more fitting to be used as a reason in case a situation like Miriam’s (hospital confinement, physical incapacity) pops out in a question.
That case is Paderanga v. CA (1995) where the person who applied for bail was confined in a hospital:
[In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called “house arrest” or, in the case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission of his application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.]
–Paderanga v. CA, 1995
Thus, if a person is confined in a hospital, he can still apply for bail and would be considered as an applicant in custody if he EXPRESSLY submitted to physical and legal control over his person. He does this by:
1. filing for the application for bail with the trial court
2. furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts
3. by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the court.
This is not an exception to the rule, it’s just that the applicant would be considered as a person in the CONSTRUCTIVE CUSTODY of the law.
Now take note. Custody is the ONLY CONDITION FOR BAIL in terms of when it can be granted.
Thus, if a court requires that an arraignment has to first happen before a bail bond can be approved, the court is wrong because (1) nothing in the Constitution or the Rules of Court provides such a condition and (2) the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash:
“This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that “the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,” while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.“
–Lavides v. CA, 2000
There is also no requirement that the accused has to be CHARGED FIRST because even the Rules of Court provide that:
“(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.“
–Sec. 17(c), Rule 114, Rules of Court
Let’s move on to Bail in the military.
Bail in the Military
Bail is not available in court martial proceedings. The right to speedy trial is given more emphasis:
“We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that ‘the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.'”
–Comendador v. Villa, 1991
The reason is because the military has a unique structure and that it may be a danger to national security to allow bail to military personnel. Also, court martial proceedings are not considered criminal in nature. Thus, the constitutional right to bail is not available to the military.
So much for “all persons.” Anyway..
This doctrine also does not violate the equal protection clause:
“The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.”
–Comendador v. Villa, 1991
BUT DO NOT APPLY THIS IN A REGULAR COURT PROCEEDING, ONLY IN COURT MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS. It would be absurd if a military man is accused of theft in a regular criminal proceeding and he wouldn’t be granted bail.
And now, we come to another painful topic, bail in extradition proceedings.
Bail in extradition proceedings
Before, bail was limited to criminal proceedings. The reasoning was that (1) there is no “conviction” in extradition proceedings, (2) the right to bail emanates from the presumption of innocence and there is no such presumption in extradition proceedings.
The case that said the above is Government of the USA v. Purganan (2002). But we won’t be discussing the previous cases anymore.
SEGUE: Extradition proceedings are sui generis
“It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.“
–Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia, 2007
Now, in the case of Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia (2007), the SC held that bail is not be limited to criminal proceedings. It can be available to administrative proceedings where respondents are detained like in deportation, extradition, or quarantine:
[The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: ‘The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.’ The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.]
– Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia, 2007
Another reason aside from Sec. 11, Article II (“The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights”) is that the Philippines has an obligation under international conventions to uphold human rights:
“The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.“
–Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia, 2007
SEGUE: The right to bail in non-criminal proceedings is granted by due process under Sec. 1, Art. III (among other things like to uphold human rights, specifically liberty) and not the right to bail under Sec. 13, Art. III.
Now that it’s settled that bail applies to extradition proceedings because the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty, what are the standards to be set?
Well, all the potential extraditee has to do is prove by CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE that he is NOT A FLIGHT RISK and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court:
“While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the “temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
x x x x
The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.“
–Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia, 2007
As explained above, the reason of this higher standard is that in criminal proceedings, there is a presumption of innocence, in extradition cases, there is a presumption that the extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
I guess that’s understandable enough. Let’s go to waiver.
Waiver
Like most of the rights of the accused, this right is also waivable:
[Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term “in custody of the law” than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty.
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
x x x x
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to counsel and to remain silent; and the right to be heard.
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.1âwphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.]
–People v. Donato, 1991
So how can one waive the right to bail?
1. If both parties agreed (defense and prosecution) that the accused “will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person,” he cannot later on be granted bail. This is what happened in People v. Donato (1991). Donato and fellow accused were imprisoned and they filed for a petition for habeas corpus. But then, they agreed with the prosecution that their habeas corpus petition be dismissed as long as Donato’s fellow accused be granted temporary liberty while he stays in legal custody. A noble sacrifice that was not forgotten by the court.
2. Failure to call the attention of the trial court to the accused’s unresolved application for bail. Raising the issue on appeal will not cure this:
“While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly.
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they raise this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail.”
–People v. Manes, 1999
3. I guess the most obvious waiver would be to not apply for bail at all up to the finality of one’s judgment of conviction.
Alright, I guess that’s it for bail. There are also other provisions on bail, but they can be found in Rule 114 and can be studied without the need of any discussion.
DO NOT TAKE THIS FOR GRANTED. THERE ARE IMPORTANT RULES THERE THAT MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A BAR QUESTION like:
Sec. 26- application for bail not a bar to challenge the validity of one’s arrest
Sec. 8- Evidence in bail automatically reproduced at trial
Sec. 16- When bail not required
Sec. 9- Factors in considering the amount of bail
Alright, that’s it for bail, let’s continue with Presumption of Innocence and some other rights of the accused in our next post.
The Bartender 