These rights are embedded in Sec. 19 of the Constitution.
RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING, INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
Justice Leonen masterfully and wholly explains the right against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment in his Separate Opinion in In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020).
I’ll try to summarize it here.
Our justice system is primarily punitive. That’s why not all forms of punishment are prohibited, only the cruel, degrading, and inhuman ones:
“Despite a few statutes and rules promoting the rehabilitation of offenders, our criminal justice system is primarily punitive, seeking to deter and penalize felonies and crimes through imprisonment and fines. Thus, the Constitution does not prohibit retributive justice in itself. What it prohibits is cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment.”
–Justice Leonen Separate Opinion, In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020
Only in the 1987 Constitution has the words “degrading” and “inhuman” been added and the word “unusual” removed. This means that these words have different applications:
[The adding of “inhuman” and “degrading” to the prohibited punishment reveals that these words are meant to be treated separately from cruel or unusual punishment, and meant to address different circumstances.
In People v. Dionisio, this Court explained that punishment is cruel and unusual when the penalties imposed are inhuman, barbarous, and shocking to the conscience:
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category.
Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:
“It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.’ Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be ‘flagrantly and plainly oppressive,’ ‘wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years’ confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant’s and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.”]
–Justice Leonen Separate Opinion, In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020
From the above, we can see that it is NOT THE SEVERITY of the punishment that makes it unconstitutional. The punishment has to be ‘flagrantly and plainly oppressive,’ ‘wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’
In one case, the lower court reduced the penalty prescribed by law (from minimum 5 years to just 6 months) to a person because they deemed it too severe given accused’s the situation. The SC ruled that that is not allowed. The legislature’s penalty is not to be judged in exceptional cases. HOWEVER, the SC still recommended the imprisonment FOR THAT SPECIFIC PERSON be reduced to 6 months NOT BECAUSE the punishment is cruel, but because of the person’s intent and degree of malice (which is little to none):
“The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
x x x x
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years. However, considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. The appellant will pay the costs of both instances.”
–People v. Estoista, 1953
In other words, the judge cannot lower the minimum penalty provided by the legislature.
So, if not the severity? Then what should matter? What matters is the CHARACTER of the punishment, not the severity:
[In Maturan v. Commission on Elections, this Court reiterated that it is the punishment’s character, not its severity, that makes it cruel and inhuman. It would have to be an infliction of “corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of [their] humanity”:
We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the punishment rather than at its severity, as the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People, to wit:
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.
In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.]
–Justice Leonen Separate Opinion, In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020
Thus, cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment actually refer to those old-school punishments aside from imprisonment. The last bold sentence shows the examples.
These cruel, degrading, and inhuman forms of punishment include TORTURE:
“The constitutional right thus necessarily ensures that all persons are protected against all forms of torture. Republic Act No. 9745, otherwise known as the Anti-Torture Act, outlines what constitutes torture and other types of cruel and degrading treatment or punishment.”
–Justice Leonen Separate Opinion, In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020
There is a difference between (1) torture and (2) cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment insofar as the latter involves a person in custody. Nevertheless, both of them are absolutely prohibited by the Constitution, even in times of war or public emergency:
[Cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment involves causing suffering, gross humiliation, or debasement to a person in custody. Torture, on the other hand, generally involves intentionally causing severe mental or physical agony for a specific purpose or for any reason based on discrimination.
The right against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment is absolute. It is protected in all cases—even in times of war or a public emergency:
SECTION 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, an Absolute Right. — Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising an “order of battle” shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.]
–Justice Leonen Separate Opinion, In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020
What’s the remedy then? Acquittal? No. According to R.A. 9745, those responsible will be held liable and the victims will be compensated.
What if a penalty made by the legislature is held to be unconstitutional? Then of course no rights or duties will come from a void law:
[The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties. Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well as its exception: “Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”]
–CIR v. San Roque, 2013
DEATH PENALTY
Is the death penalty absolutely prohibited? No. The legislature can allow the imposition of the death penalty if there are compelling reasons involving heinous crimes:
So does that mean that the death penalty is not cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment? Yes:
[In In Re: Kemmler, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of that same Court stated that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”]
-Perez v. People, 2008
And of course at the time of its effectivity, all death penalty already imposed was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Since there is no death penalty now, I don’t think we need to discuss the nuances of the death penalty any further.
Should we discuss Sec. 19(2). Nah that’s more of a directive to Congress which most likely led to R.A. 9745.
The Bartender 