Let’s continue our discussion on the rights of the accused.
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
This right refers mainly to the part of the arraignment proceedings where the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him based on the Information or complaint, and whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The reason behind this right has been explained as early as 1904:
[First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. For example, if a malicious intent is a necessary ingredient of the particular offense, then malice must be alleged. In other words, the prosecution will not be permitted to prove, under proper objection, a single material fact unless the same is duly set forth by proper allegation in his complaint. Proof or evidence of material facts is rendered admissible at the trial by reason of their having been duly alleged in the complaint.
x x x x
There is a general opinion that a greater degree of certainty is required in criminal pleading than in civil. This is not the rule. The same rules of certainty apply both to complaints in criminal prosecutions and petitions or demands in civil cases. Under both systems, every necessary fact must be alleged with certainty to a common intent. Allegations of “certainty to a common intent” mean that the facts must be set out in ordinary and concise language, in such a form that persons of common understanding may know what is meant.]
–U.S. v. Karelsen, 1904
The three purposes are:
1. to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to prepare for his defense;
2. to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
3. to inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.
We need to memorize these so that we can use them later on as justification if we have nothing else. To better do that, we need to understand who benefits and for what:
1. In the first rationale, it benefits the accused in the current proceedings.
key phrase: to prepare for his defense
2. In the second, it also benefits the accused but for future proceedings against him
key phrase: protection against further prosecution for the same cause
3. In the third, it benefits the court in coming up with an accurate determination
key phrase: decide whether the facts alleged are sufficient in law to support a conviction.
There are also some good principles here aside from the rationale:
1. facts must be stated, not conclusions of law
2. every fact and circumstances necessary must be included to constitute the crime
3. persons of common understanding may know what is meant
These can also be useful “bullets” later on.
I think questions on the nuances of the information and the crime charged is more likely to be given in bar questions in remedial law. Nevertheless, let’s get to it.
INFORMATION or COMPLAINT
To reflect the right to be informed in Sec. 14(2), The Rules of Court has Sections 6, 8, and 9 of Rule 110:
“Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
SECTION 8. Designation of the Offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.”
–Rule 110, Rules of Court
Thus, for a criminal complaint or information to satisfy the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, it must state the following:
(1) the name of the accused
(2) the designation given to the offense by the statute
(3) a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense
(4) the name of the offended party
(5) the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense
(6) the place where the offense had been committed
–People v. Quitlong, 1998, just a reiteration of Sec. 6, Rule 110
And if one is missing, the accused’s constitutional right to be informed is violated.
Let’s look at these one by one.
With regards to the name, I don’t think there’s any significant issue there.
For the designation of the offense, it means the title of the crime as provided by the statute. For example, Theft, Robbery, Homicide, etc. for offenses in the RPC. If the offense is in a special law, Article II Sec. 4 of R.A. 9165 Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Or if there is no title to the offense, Section 3 (b) of R.A. 3019.
The third requisite is probably the one which has been most involved in SC decisions. So, let’s go in deeper.
Aside from its designation, it’s important to include very element of the offense:
“It is thus fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the Information. No Information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.”
–People v. Solar, 2019
SEGUE: Matters aliunde means matters outside of the information. Thus, include everything essential!
Anyway, so it’s clear that the test whether the information validly charges an offense is:
whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.
But wait, what if the designation differs from the description of the offense? The description prevails:
“What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake.”
–Pecho v. People, 1996
An example of this is when the information designates the offense as one under Section 3 (b) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. However, the facts in the information actually make out the a case of bribery:
“The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.”
–Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, 1984
Here’s another situation, what if the crime proved is different from the crime charged? The answer is it depends.
It’s possible that a person can be liable for a crime which is not charged in the information but such crime is necessarily included in the offense:
“It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.”
–Pecho v. People, 1996
AS seen from the provision above, it can also go the other way. It can be that the crime charged is necessarily included in the crime proved. In this case, the accused can only be convicted of the crime charged.
SEGUE: To know whether a crime is necessarily included in another:
“Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.”
–Rule 120, Rules of Court
Key phrases here are “some of the essential elements of the former” and “constitute the latter”
Anyway..
Sec. 4, Rule 120 is also called the VARIANCE DOCTRINE or VARIANCE RULE. To explain:
“Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.”
–Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 2019
To simplify, in case of variance between the crime charged and the crime proved, the accused should be convicted of the lesser offense.
It would perhaps be better to provide examples:
1. Acts of Lasciviousness under RA 7610 is necessarily included in Rape by Sexual Assault (Most common):
“Thus, following the Variance Doctrine, petitioner can be held liable for Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the offense charged in the information, which is necessarily included in the crime proved, which is Rape by Sexual Assault.”
–Talusig v. People, 2017
2. Possession of Illegal Drugs is necessarily included in the Transport of Illegal Drugs under R.A. 9165:
“In view thereof, petitioners may, in theory, still be held liable for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 by virtue of the variance doctrine as enunciated in Section 4,Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. On this score, the transport of the illegal drugs would necessarily entail the possession thereof.”
–Musa v. People, 2019
3. Qualified Theft necessarily included in Estafa 1(b):
“Thus, being a mere custodian of the unremitted tuition fees and not, in any manner, an agent who could have asserted a right against TGWSI over the same, petitioner had only acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa as charged.
x x x x x
Nevertheless, a reading of the information and an appreciation of the evidence show qualified theft. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4 in relation to Section 5,Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is proper to hold petitioner guilty of qualified theft because the latter crime was necessarily included in the crime charged in the information.”
–Reside v. People, 2020
4. Rape by Sexual Assault NOT necessarily included in Rape through Sexual Intercourse:
“In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter.”
–People v. Caoili, 2017
That’s it for the variance doctrine.
Just one last point, don’t confuse the variance doctrine with the rule that the description or the actual recital of facts prevails over the designation/caption in the information.
Here’s a simplistic illustration:
Moving on..
In a somewhat related sense, that’s why even if a qualifying/aggravating circumstance is proved in trial, but not alleged in the information, it will not be considered in determining the applicable penalty. It’s unfortunate but Sec. 9 of Rule 110 above requires that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be alleged in the information:
“SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.”
–Sec. 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court
I don’t think we need examples for this anymore.
BUT, there is one important note regarding treachery and other broad terms of aggravating circumstances.
Before, there have been conflicting views on how treachery should be alleged. Some decisions say an addition of “with treachery” is sufficient while others say that the acts constituting treachery should be specifically alleged and described:
[In short, there are currently two different views on how the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be alleged. On the one hand is the view that it is sufficient that the Information alleges that the act be committed “with treachery.” The second view requires that the acts constituting treachery — or the acts which directly and specially insured the execution of the crime, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make — should be specifically alleged and described in the Information.]
–People v. Solar, 2019
This was settled in the case above, People v. Solar (2019). The controlling doctrine is thus:
“…the Court, in Solar, held, finally, that in order for the Information alleging the existence of treachery to be sufficient, it must have factual averments on how the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make. The Information must so state such means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged.”
–People v. Eduardo, 2020
But wait! The accused is not safe if the Information only states “with treachery.” If he does not question this defect in the Information prior to arraignment, he is deemed to have waived the right to question the defect and the treachery will be appreciated if proven in trial. This is in the second paragraph of the guidelines below.
Also, even if the Information only has “with treachery,” there is still a chance that it may be appreciated. How? It is sufficient to aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding probable cause against the accused. This is in the third paragraph below.
The Court in Solar laid down these guidelines:
In sum, the Court, continually cognizant of its power and mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, hereby lays down the following guidelines for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar:
1. Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must state the ultimate facts relative to such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill of particulars under the parameters set by said Rules.
Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver of his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently, the same may be appreciated against him if proven during trial.
Alternatively, prosecutors may sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding probable cause against the accused, which resolution should be attached to the Information in accordance with the second guideline below.
x x x x x]
–People v. Solar, 2019
Other cases have also cited Solar already. So, be familiar with these rules. This is more on Remedial Law but oh well.
Now what if there are two separate Informations against the accused? Can the two crimes in their respective Information be complexed upon conviction? NO:
“…we find merit in appellant Pamela’s assertion that they were wrongly convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with double homicide.
Appellants were charged with two separate informations, one for double murder and the other for violation of R.A. No. 6539 [Carnapping]. Their conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily included in the allegations in the separate informations. What controls is the description of the offense, as alleged in the information. While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two informations. Thus, the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec.14).”
–People v. Legaspi, 1995
Moving on..
There’s little to no complication in the name of the offended party.
Let’s move on to the time and date of the commission of the offense.
Should the exact time be necessary to convict the accused? No, it is enough to state any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed. But it is necessary only if time is a material ingredient of the offense:
“Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.”
–Rule 110, Rules of Court
And almost the same principle can be applied to place, with an added strictness to include the place where the crime was committed because it is important in relation to determining a court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case:
“Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for its identification.”
–Rule 110, Rules of Court
Alright, that’s enough about the Information. Let’s move on to other principles on the right to be informed.
But before that, here are just some examples from Carlo Cruz’ (Justice Isagani Cruz’ son) lecture:
- The charge was for frustrated theft. There is no such crime of frustrated theft.
- The information alleged that the victim is the stepdaughter of the accused but the evidence showed that the accused is merely a common law partner of the victim’s mother. He was convicted for a qualified seduction.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation. - An accused was charged with violation of malversation through dolo. The evidence showed that he committed malversation through culpa.
Ruling: No violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against the accused.
Dolo or culpa are only means for committing
Either way, he committed malversation. - An accused was charged with illegal sale of drugs but is convicted for illegal possession of drugs for which he was not charged.
Ruling: No violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against the accused. If one of the elements of illegal sale is not proven, for
example, the consideration, he may still be convicted for illegal possession.
Ratio: Illegal possession is inherent in the crime of illegal sale. Variance doctrine. - The accused was caught selling illegal drugs. After lawful search on him, illegal drugs were found in his pocket. He was acquitted for illegal sale but is charged for illegal possession because of the drugs found inside his pocket.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed. He was not charged for illegal possession of the drugs found in his pocket. He was charged only for illegal sale.
(I don’t get this but probably because the drugs object of the sale is different from that in his pocket) - The accused was charged with homicide by stabbing.
He was convicted of homicide by drowning.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Homicide by stabbing and homicide by drowning requires two different defenses. - The accused was charged with rape with intimidation. It was proven that the girl was raped while sleeping.
Ruling: There is violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Again, these two charges require two different evidences.
OTHERS CONCERNS NOT RELATED TO THE INFORMATION or COMPLAINT
What if the accused is deaf-mute? Then a sign language expert/qualified interpreter should be present to assist him:
“The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused’s own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.”
–People v. Crisologo, 1987
But is it enough if the deaf-mute accused was helped and assisted by someone he knows for more than a decade? NO:
“Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The fact that he was “helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983″, as noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of appellant.”
–People v. Parazo, 1999
What then is the consequence if the deaf-mute has no interpreter/sign language expert? He should be re-arraigned and re-tried. This is what happened in Parazo. In Crisologo, the accused was acquitted not because of the lack of an interpreter, but because there is also reasonable doubt.
Aside from the Information and what happens in the arraignment, the right to be informed can also be violated by a vague provision of law:
“The defendant is also denied the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and, hence, should be avoided. This is the void-for-vagueness rule. Thus, a law imposing penalties upon a person for being a “gangster” is constitutionally flawed if it does not define the word with such reasonable specificity as to sufficiently inform the ordinary individual of its meaning and thus enable him to avoid violation of its provision.”
-Justice Isagani Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007, p. 335
But the standard is not that strict. A reasonable degree of certainty is enough for the statute to be upheld:
“The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.”
–Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 2001
But be hesitant to use this because no penal law has ever been declared unconstitutional for being vague.
WAIVER
Can the right to be informed under Sec. 14(2) be waived? No, as a reason of public policy:
“The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information.”
–People v. Flores, 2002
BUT, the accused can waive his right to enter a plea. The result will just be an automatic plea of “not guilty”:
“Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of ‘not guilty’ in their behalf.”
–People v Ferdinand Dy, 2002
Here’s another but. If the accused refuses to be informed, the case will still go on and there will be no violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The defense cannot hold the court hostage:
“However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
x x x x
Nonetheless, accused-appellants were substantially informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them when their counsel received a copy of the Prosecutor’s resolution maintaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read the complaint or information in a language or dialect known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to accused-appellants. Not only did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk and deny the charges against them. The conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the accusations against them.”
–People v Ferdinand Dy, 2002
That’s it for the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
Let’s go to right to speedy, impartial, and public trial.
Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial
No intro needed for this one Let’s start with the right to speedy trial.
SPEEDY TRIAL
The purpose of the right to a speedy trial is (1) for an innocent person to be free from anxiety and court expense and (2) for a guilty person to be determined guilty within the shortest possible time:
“An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his or her guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he or she may interpose.”
–Villa v. Fernandez, 2018
The practical meaning of the right to speedy trial:
“This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays…”
–Tan v. People, 2009
But the violations of the right are not limited to vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, there are more ways to violate the right to speedy trial:
“Thus, the right to speedy trial is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having one’s case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a person has been denied the right to speedy trial, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and prejudice resulting from the delay, are considered.”
–Villa v. Fernandez, 2018
To summarize the above passage, we have the following ways to violate the right:
1. proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays
2. when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured
3. when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having one’s case tried
Memorize these three as they’ll be useful in analysis-type questions.
There is no hard and fast rule. Violations of the right to speedy trial should be considered in a case-to-case basis, using a BALANCING TEST in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed:
“A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.”
There are four factors to consider when determining whether a person has been denied the right to speedy trial:
a. length of the delay
b. reason for the delay
c. assertion or non-assertion of the right
d. prejudice resulting from the delay
–Tan v. People, 2009, citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 2004
Thus, a mere mathematical computation is not sufficient to declare that the right has been violated:
“We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.”
–Tan v. People, 2009
As for examples, there are a lot in the cases we just cited bove. The SC discussed there previous instances when there was or wasn’t a violation of the right to speedy trial.
Fun fact: We have R.A. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 which is implemented by SC Circular 38-98. which has been incorporated in the Rules of Court. The most notable provisions are Sec. 2 of Rule 119 on Trial and Sec. 1(g) of Rule 116 on Arraignment:
[Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. — Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. (2a)
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (sec. 8, cir. 38-98).
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
Sec. 1, Rule 116
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period. (sec. 2, cir. 38-98)]
–Sec. 2, Rule 119 and Sec. 1(g), Rule 116, Rules of Court
BUT, the Constitution still prevails and there may still be violations of the right to speedy trial despite the prosecution abiding by these mathematical computations because of this clause in SC Circular 38-98:
“SEC. 15. Republic Act No. 8493 Not a Bar to Provision on Speedy Trial in the Constitution.— No provision of Republic Act No. 8493 shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article 111, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution.”
That’s why we still go back to the three ways to violate the right to speedy trial and the four factors to consider.
But wait, so does that mean we’ll never be able to make use of the prescribed time period? No. They still have a use in determining who has the burden of proving that there is (or there is no) a violation of the right to speedy trial:
“If it has been alleged that there was delay within the stated time periods, the burden of proof is on the defense to show that there has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to speedy disposition of cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights.
x x x x
If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time periods, the burden of proof shifts. The prosecution will now have the burden to prove that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases.”
–Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 2018, penned by Justice Leonen
Thus, if the prescribed period has not lapsed, the defense has the burden of proof. But if the prescribed period has already lapsed, the burden SHIFTS to the prosecution.
There is a use for the periods in the Rules of Court after all.
The next question in mind would be, can the right be WAIVED? The answer is yes. The accused must assert the right upon instances of delay. That is why assertion or non-assertion is included in the 4 factors of determining a violation of the right to speedy trial:
“The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege.”
–Uy v. Adriano, 2006
“Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.”
–Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 2018, penned by Justice Leonen
So if it can be proven that the right to speedy trial was indeed violated, what would be the effect? (1) Dismissal of the case equivalent to an acquittal and (2) release by habeas corpus if the accused is under detention:
“The remedy an accused has for violation of his right to speedy trial is dismissal of the case and, if he is under detention, release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is therefore a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”
-Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the R.P. A Commentary, 2009, p. 529
And from what we can derive from the name, speedy trial only applies to the trial proper. But does it also apply to the proceedings before trial? In other words, when does the right to speedy trial begin? It begins upon the filing of the formal complaint or Information:
“Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.”
–Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 2018
This ruling above is more appropriate for Ombudsman proceedings. For criminal cases in general, we have this basis:
“…the test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is, therefore, not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial.”
–People v. Orsal, 1982
So when does it end then? It ends after the trial is finished of course. But then, we still have the right to the speedy disposition of cases which applies not just to criminal proceedings but to any judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. But we’ll talk more about that later when we discuss Sec. 16.
Let’s move on to impartial trial.
IMPARTIAL TRIAL
The right to an impartial trial basically just means that the judge is not impartial. The key phrase is “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”:
“This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.”
–Javier v. COMELEC, 1986
So it’s important that the judge APPEARS impartial. This means mingling or socializing with one of the parties may be a ground for violation of the right to an impartial trial.
I just realized we already discussed impartiality before in the post on procedural due process.
I’ll just paste it here.
In the Evelio Javier case above, the COMELEC was ruled to not have followed procedural due process because of the judge’s impartiality. It’s not a criminal case but the principle of impartiality can still apply:
“Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased.”
–Javier v. COMELEC, 1986
Here, we can see that the reason was that Commissioner Opinion did not inhibit (in non-legal terms: excuse or disqualify) himself despite his close ties to the respondent (Evelio Javier’s opponent, Assemblyman Pacificador) as they were form law partners. Commissioner Opinion even objected to the transfer of the case to another division. Thus, this display of impartiality constitutes a denial of procedural due process.
There are many more cases that dwell on this impartiality requirement in procedural due process, but we’ll leave the details out. Else, we’ll be writing a whole book.
Here are some principles out of those cases (courtesy of Justice Nachura’s book):
1. There is impartiality if the judge overzealously (passionately) cross-examined the party himself, assuming the role of magistrate (judge) and advocate (lawyer).
2. BUT, the judge is allowed to intensively question witnesses as long as it is necessary, for clarificatory purposes, or for ascertaining the veracity of the witness’ statements (fancy legal phrasing for “making sure that the witness is not lying”).
3. The officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review.
To better safeguard the right to an impartial trial, we also have provisions in the Rules of Court and in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Rule 137:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Canon 3:
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances where:
x x x x
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; x x x.
Rule 137, Sec. 1 disqualifies a judge based on:
1. pecuniary interest
2. relationship to the parties-within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel
3. presiding in a previous case subject to review
Canon 3, Sec. 5 then expanded the relationships that causes disqualification to:
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein.
These are the conditions for an automatic disqualification. But, as said in Rule 137, the judge may inhibit himself for other reasons.
What then would the effect be if the judge was found to be partial? Well, in the Evelio Javier case, the judge found to be partial was in a COMELEC which is a collegiate court. The result is that his vote would be nullified. But what if the partial judge is in a trial court where he is the lone judge? The whole proceeding will be voided and there will be a mistrial. If the judgment is acquittal, it will be reversed and there will be no double jeopardy. This is what happened in the trial of Ninoy Aquino’s killers here the presiding Justice was discovered to be a part of a secret conference in Malacañang together with the prosecution team and President Marcos:
“Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence.
x x x x
In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the “treacherous and vicious assassination” and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.”
–Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 1986
PUBLIC TRIAL
This seems simple enough so let’s keep it short.
The reason for the right to a public trial is to make sure that the trial is fairly conducted, or in other words, free from arbitrariness as to afford due process to the accused. It should also not be confused with a publicized trial which tends to violate the accused’s right to due process:
“It bears emphasizing that the right to a public trial belongs first and foremost to the accused. Said right requires that proceedings be open to the public to ensure that the accused is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. The openness of a trial safeguards against attempts to employ the courts as instruments of persecution since it induces all the participants therein, e.g. judge, lawyers, witnesses, to perform their duties conscientiously, and provides the public with an opportunity to observe the events therein. However, a public trial is not to be equated with a ‘publicized trial,’ one characterized by pervasive adverse publicity that violates the accused’s constitutional right to due process.”
–RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, 2001
And perhaps the only relevant SC rulings regarding the right to public trial involves the question “should trials be broadcasted?”
We have three high-profile cases that tackled this question. Eerily, the cases happened roughly every 10 years starting from 1991:
1. Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case (1991)
2. Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada (2001 and 2001 Resolution for MR)
3. In re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan (2011 and 2012 Resolution for MR)
In the first case, broadcast and recording during trial proper was held to be absolutely prohibited:
“The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.
x x x
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.”
–Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case (1991)
In the second case, that rule was relaxed and allowed audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes BUT LIVE BROADCASTING IS PROHIBITED:
“Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
x x x x
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that “the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law.” (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.”
–Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada, 2001 Resolution for MR
The reasons above are:
1. Historic significance
2. Right to information on matters of public concern
3. Education and civic training of the people
In our third case, the 2011 Resolution allowed the live broadcast of the trial, saying that there is no scientific evidence that there will be prejudice to the accused among other reasons. But in the 2012 Resolution, the live TV broadcasting was again prohibited, resulting in the roughly same decision as in the Erap trial:
“In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a public trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. The accused’s right to a public trial should not be confused with the freedom of the press and the public’s right to know as a justification for allowing the live broadcast of the trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject case to generate undue publicity with its concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact that the accused has legal remedies after the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been done and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the fundamental right to due process of the accused cannot be afforded after the fact but must be protected at the first instance.”
–In re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, 2012 Resolution for MR
But a form of live broadcasting was allowed but limited to the premises surrounding Camp Bagong Diwa and to other courts in Mindanao where the accused’s relatives can watch. The reason for this is because of the physical impossibility of accommodating the large number of interested parties in Camp Bagong Diwa:
“To address the physical impossibility of accommodating the large number of interested parties inside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, it is not necessary to allow the press to broadcast the proceedings here and abroad, but the Court may allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing areas outside the courtroom where those who may be so minded can come and watch the proceedings. This out-of-court, real-time viewing grants to a larger audience the opportunity to monitor the proceedings as if they were inside the trial court but at the same time obviates the massive publicity entailed in media broadcasting. This is similar to the procedure adopted by this Court in allowing members of the public to watch its oral arguments at a viewing area outside of the Session Hall where a large monitor projects the images and sounds from inside the Session Hall in real time.”
–In re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, 2012 Resolution for MR
So what can we learn from these three cases?
1. Publicizing a trial involves an inherent denial of due process:
“The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.”
2. Audiovisual recording is allowed for documentary purposes especially if the following reasons are present:
a. Historic significance
b. Right to information on matters of public concern
c. Education and civic training of the people
3. Live broadcast is allowed if it is physically impossible to accommodate the large number of interested parties in the courtroom. But the live broadcasting will be limited to the areas surrounding the courtroom or wherever the Court sees fit like in courtrooms near where the accused’s relatives may reside:
“to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.”
But is the right to a public trial absolute? Not really. The audience may be limited if the evidence presented is “offensive to decency or public morals”:
“Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as “offensive to decency or public morals.”
–Garcia v. Domingo, 1973
Now here’s a funny last question. Can the accused demand for a private trial? I don’t think so but I’m not too sure why lol.
Anyway, that’s it. We’ll move on to the right of confrontation next time.
The Bartender 