Adequate Legal Assistance and Free Access to Courts

This topic is a breath of fresh air as we don’t have much to discuss here. It’s funny how our average post has 4.4k words. This will surely bring that number down a bit 🙂

Alright, let’s get to it.

Doesn’t the equal protection clause and due process clause already cover this? Yes, but it needed emphasis in our Constitution. Thus, even if Sec. 11 does not exist, the courts still cannot deny access to the poor:
“The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.”
Re Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi, 2009

What then is the effect of Sec. 11? It allows indigents to be exempted from legal fees. To implement this provision, we have Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 21, Rule 3:
“Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
x x x x”

Sec. 19, Rule 141:
“Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.- Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.
x x x x”

These rules allow something called litigation in forma pauperis.

BUT WAIT, don’t these two rules seem conflicting? Which is it, The monetary standard set in Rule 141? Or the “no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family” standard set in rule 21?

The answer is that both these provisions are operative and they were harmonized in Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (2006):
“…the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that is, the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has “no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.”
Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, 2006

Thus, these are the steps:
1. The Court will use Sec. 19 Rule 141 or the standard on income and property to scrutinize the documents submitted by a party applying as a pauper litigant. If he/she passes, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.
2. If the party does not pass the first test, a hearing will be set where he/she will have the opportunity to prove that he/she is still a pauper litigant under Sec. 3 Rule 21 (“no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family”) At this stage and even after but before judgment, the adverse party can present countervailing evidence.

The Administrative Code of 1987 also explicitly exempts the clients of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) from paying legal fees:
“Section 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit.- The clients of the PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal. The costs of the suit, attorney’s fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO.”

This provision has been acknowledged and allowed by the Court to be operative:
Such exemption by virtue of Republic Act No. 9406 was recognized by the Court Administrator through OCA Circular No. 67-2007, but the clients of the PAO remained required to submit relevant documentation to comply with the conditions prescribed by Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Later on, the Court Administrator removed the conditions prescribed under OCA Circular No. 67-2007 by issuing Circular No. 121-2007. Since then until the present, all clients of the PAO have been exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court whether as an original proceeding or on appeal.
Pangcatan v. Maghuyop, 2016

The clients of IBP under their free legal aid program is also exempted from legal fees, provided that they pass their various tests:
“WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this resolution.”
Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA), 2009

TRIVIA: IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same indigency and merit tests used by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other than indigency, are disqualified from availing of the services of the PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting defenses, and other similar causes.

Everything seems to be understandable right? But then, there have been cases that offered clarification to the provision on free access.

First, the provision only applies to NATURAL litigants and not to corporations, even if such corporations are foundations that work for indigent and underprivileged people:
“The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.”
Re Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi, 2009

Second, an appellate court cannot dismiss a case based solely on the non-payment of legal fees if the trial court approved a party to be a Pauper Litigant. After all, it is not the Pauper Litigant’s fault:
“Under the circumstances, the CA grossly erred in annulling and setting aside the judgment of the RTC based solely on the non-payment of the filing fees. If the RTC had incorrectly granted Pangcatan’s Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant, the grant was not jurisdictional but an error of judgment on its part as the trial court. It can hardly be disputed that the RTC apparently believed based on its erroneous application of the aforementioned guidelines set by the Rules of Court that Pangcatan was entitled to be exempted from the payment of the filing fees because his daily income was P400.00.

It is true that the non-payment of the filing fees usually prevents the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the claim stated in the complaint But for the CA to annul the judgment rendered after trial based solely on such non-payment was not right and just considering that the non-payment of the filing fees had not been entirely attributable to the plaintiff alone. The trial court was more, if not exclusively, to blame for the omission. For sure, all that Pangcatan had done was to apply for the exemption, leaving to the RTC the decision whether or not to grant his application. Moreover, the CA disregarded the fact that the RTC, through its order of September 4, 2002, had granted his Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant and had allowed him to litigate as an indigent party subject to the condition that the legal fees would constitute a first lien on the monetary judgment to be rendered after trial.”
Pangcatan v. Maghuyop, 2016

I guess that’s it. There seems to be no further complications we can explore regarding this provision. Let’s move on to the right against self-incrimination next time.

Published by John Marti Maghopoy

Past Economist. Current Lawyer. Forever writer.

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