I didn’t expect the previous post to be so long, but we have no choice if we want to really digest these important topics. Also, I just found out that we’re delayed by 5 days. But oh well, that’s a problem for another day.
To recap, these are the 7 instances of a valid warrantless search and seizure:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (done)
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view (done)
3. Search of a moving vehicle
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and frisk
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
Moving on, let’s continue the discussion with the search of a moving vehicle.
3. Search of a moving vehicle (WARNING: MOST CONFUSING)
Let’s thank People v. Sapla (2020) penned by Justice Caguioa for explaining everything we need to know in “search of a moving vehicle.” It is a gold mine of all important cases relating to search of a moving vehicle. It’s also an en banc case which settles “once and for all” an issue we’ll talk about later. Every uncited passage within bold brackets [] came from this case.
[According to jurisprudence, “warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.”
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when “the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.“]
There will be more paragraphs from this case later on, but looking at these first two, we can tell that there are two ways to search a moving vehicle:
1. Routine check where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection
2. An extensive search but only when the inspecting officer made it upon probable cause
ROUTINE INSPECTION
The first one basically describes a military or police checkpoint:
[The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.
However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following:
(a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
(b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
(f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.]
But note that this should not be applied to ports and airports:
“On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v. People, the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in accordance with routine security measures in ports. This case, however, should not be construed to apply to border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; there is a “reasonable reduced expectation of privacy” when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports of travel.”
–Veridiano v. People, 2017, penned by Leonen
In short, an extensive search is mostly allowed in ports and airports for heightened security purposes.
That’s fairly easy to understand. Moving on…
EXTENSIVE SEARCH
The second way to search a moving vehicle, on the other hand, is a little trickier:
[When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, “such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.”]
In other words, the apprehending officers need to have probable cause before they can extensively search a vehicle.
As we’ve learned before, the generic probable cause for a search is:
“such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.”
In the search of a moving vehicle, following People v. Sapla, this can be modified to be:
“such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.“
The question now is, when it comes to the examination, how can we know if there is probable cause in the problem?
Well, we’ll need the help of jurisprudence for that.
- No probable cause- Tipped information ALONE.
“law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.“
–Veridiano v. People, 2017, penned by Leonen - No probable cause- Tipped information + informer pointing to the suspect
“the authorities acted upon an information that the accused would be arriving from Iloilo on board a vessel, the M/V Wilcon 9. The authorities waited for the vessel to arrive, accosted the accused, and inspected the latter’s bag wherein bundles of marijuana leaves were found. The Court declared that the search and seizure was illegal, holding that, at the time of his apprehension, Aminnudin was not “committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. x x x To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.””
–People v. Sapla, citing People v. Aminnudin, 1988 - Probable cause- Tipped information + personal observations
“apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused had in their possession. In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the way. Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and leaving one’s belongings behind is unusual conduct.”
–Veridiano v. People, citing People v. Breis, 2015 - Probable cause- tipped information + personal observations
“The police officers in People v. Ayangao and People v. Libnao likewise received tipped information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the accused was arrested. On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused.”
–Veridiano v. People, citing People v. Ayangao, 2004 and People v. Libnao, 2003 - Probable cause- Personal observations of suspicious behavior [error: these examples are for stop and frisk searches]
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing drugs. When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with “reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner.” The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers. These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs. These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers “to stop [the] petitioner [and] investigate.”
In People v. Solayao, police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also “wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.” Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the suspicion. After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed “homemade firearm” in his possession. This court ruled that “[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.” This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
–People v. Cogaed, 2014, penned by Leonen, citing Manalili v. CA, 1997 and People v. Solayao, 1996
Though this is more appropriate for a Stop and Frisk Search where at least two suspicious behaviors are necessary to form a genuine reason (not probable cause) for the officer to conduct a search. - No probable cause– Personal observation by a third person
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”
–People v. Cogaed, 2014, penned by Leonen - Probable cause- Personal observation of suspicious behavior + smell of marijuana
a police officer rode a bus with the accused therein from Baguio City to Olongapo City. The officer noticed that the accused was acting suspiciously with her woven buri bag. While in transit, the officer inserted his finger in the buri bag and smelled marijuana. However, the officer did not do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, the officer apprehended her and brought her to the police station. There, a search on the bag of the accused yielded marijuana. In that case, the Court ruled that the officer had probable cause to conduct a valid warrantless arrest and make a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
–Macad v. People, 2018, citing People v. Claudio, 1988
We can see the trend here.
Other instances of suspicious behavior which must be personally observed by the apprehending officer are:
-inability to present supporting documents
-uneasy behavior when asked about the contents of their bag
-inability to produce identification after the suspects introduced themselves as military
-speeding away after noticing a checkpoint
-noticing a tucked gun and the suspect unable to present documents relating to the gun
All of these instances were shown through previous cases and discussed in the case of People v. Yanson (2019) also penned by Leonen. They, with or without tipped information, were deemed sufficient for probable cause. In these cases, extensive or intrusive search and seizure were justified.
The bottom line is:
1. SOLITARY TIPPED INFORMATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO PRODUCE PROBABLE CAUSE
2. THERE SHOULD BE SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR
3. THE SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR MUST BE PERSONALLY OBSERVED BY THE APPREHENDING OFFICER AND NOT BY A THIRD PERSON
Based from:
There were overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the holding that an inclusive warrantless search can be conducted on the solitary basis of tipped information is far from being an established and inflexible doctrine.
-Emphasized in People v. Sapla, 2020
and
“law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.”
–Veridiano v. People, 2017, penned by Leonen
For an extra note, there are sort of extra guidelines for search of a bus while in transit as laid down in People v. Saluday (2018), as summarized in People v. Sapla:
[The Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in transit:
(1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive;
(2) the search must not be discriminatory;
(3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and
(4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.]
This is what happened in that case as explained in People v. Sapla:
[The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. People (Saluday), a bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case, the authorities merely conducted a “visual and minimally intrusive inspection” of the accused’s bag-by simply lifting the bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the search conducted entailed the probing of the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.
Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer information relayed by an informant, unlike in the instant case. In Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses in determining probable cause, i.e., having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the accused therein.]
As to what happened in People v. Sapla, as expected, they did not have probable cause to search the bus because they did not follow the guidelines above:
[It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.
First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual and minimally intrusive, the search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the blue sack that he allegedly possessed.
Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory. Unlike in Saluday where the bags of the other bus passengers were also inspected, the search conducted in the instant case focused exclusively on accused-appellant Sapla.
Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety. At the most, the search was conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous informant, was transporting illegal drugs.
Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the police to ensure that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory, photographing, and marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla at the scene of the incident.]
So, let’s thank People v. Sapla for explaining all of this to us and pointing us to Leonen’s cases which gave further elucidation on the matter.
The case’s final persuasive note:
Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search – which include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence – should be the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.
–People v. Sapla, 2020
Confusion
As I said in the title of search of a moving vehicle, this method of warrantless search is the most confusing.
First, because previous cases have upheld instances where tipped information alone was enough for probable cause (We didn’t include the said cases in this discussion). I guess it’s great that People v. Sapla set the record straight.
Second, there’s a case that may tend to confuse:
The 2018 decision of People v. Comprado sort of bred confusion. The recent case stated that search of a moving vehicle should only target vehicles, and not the persons therein:
[The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person. ]
Why can it breed confusion? Because, for one, some of the cases we discussed before seem to suggest that the persons were targetted and not necessarily the vehicle. But that’s okay that’s how jurisprudence works. There may be some inconsistencies.
Another reason for the confusion is that because we might think that the story ends there. We might say that “Oh! This is not a search of a moving vehicle! No probable cause! Invalid search.” But nope it does not. We may not classify it as a search of a moving vehicle, but then, we have to classify it as something else. Does it qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest? a stop-and-frisk? So we also have to continue our answer if we use the reasoning in Comprado.
I guess that applies to all warrantless searches. If the search is invalid, we have to reason out by eliminating all possible types of searches applicable to the case.
RECAP
The bottom line is:
1. SOLITARY TIPPED INFORMATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO PRODUCE PROBABLE CAUSE
2. THERE SHOULD BE SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR
3. THE SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR MUST BE PERSONALLY OBSERVED BY THE APPREHENDING OFFICER AND NOT BY A THIRD PERSON
Based from:
There were overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the holding that an inclusive warrantless search can be conducted on the solitary basis of tipped information is far from being an established and inflexible doctrine.
-Emphasized in People v. Sapla, 2020
and
“law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.”
–Veridiano v. People, 2017, penned by Leonen
Use Comprado if the question is “Is this a search of a moving vehicle? In that way, the Comprado reasoning is very much responsive because it now specifically relates to determining whether the search is a search of a moving vehicle. It’s also faster and easier to use.
Thus, the answer will be:
No, the acts of the officers do not constitute a search of a moving vehicle.
As held in People v. Comprado, in a search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person.
Here, the information relayed to the officer was that a passenger of a [insert motor vehicle here] was carrying illegal drugs. Clearly, the target is the specific person who just so happens to be a passenger of the moving vehicle.
Thus, the search in this case cannot be classified as a valid search of a moving vehicle.
So I’ll stop here. It’s unfair to the next warrantless search which will get far less coverage than our beloved search of a moving vehicle.
The Bartender 
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